THE war against terrorism has put ungoverned and weakly governed spaces into the limelight, and governance in such areas is being debated. Globally, various options, including kinetic, administrative, and constitutional steps, have been introduced. However, the consequences of kinetic approaches include the displacement of tribes and de-tribalisation. In a changed situation, the question is whether merely rebranding the old apparatus will serve the purpose. The real challenge for any state is to convince the locals that the new arrangements are better than the previous ones. While dealing with such situations, states are under intense pressure as they have to establish the rule of law and ensure socioeconomic development. Furthermore, in an era of disinformation, governments also have to counter the propaganda of miscreants. Establishing state authority in ungoverned or weakly governed spaces is a challenge for modern nascent states that requi­res a balance between establishing order and authority. A policy focused on a give-and-take relationship with a tribe, with more giving than taking, has proven to be the best approach. The state must consider its capacity to expand its authority — the lower the capacity, the longer it will take. Ungoverned areas can be defined as geographic regions that are either beyond the access of central authority or have weak administrative control. Besides other reasons, the lack of state authority over its territory is a reason for the concentration of militants in ungoverned areas. The existence of ‘ungoverned spaces’ within a state’s borders challenges the state’s authority, particularly its legitimate right to violence. Therefore, conflicts between tribes often seem uncontrollable, negatively impacting other parts of the state. The state must consider its capacity to expand its authority. The last four decades have also witnessed the migration of transnational terrorist networks into areas lacking central authority. Therefore, in a few such states, there is a debate on how to supersede tribal customs with the rule of law. Establishing state authority in tribal regions remains challenging, as tribes accustomed to governing their own affairs often resist external control. The state’s success depends on convincing these groups that national laws serve their interests better than traditional customs, while also managing conflicts that arise when tribes are forced to relinquish autonomy. Pakhtun tribes can be classified as nomadic, sedentary hill tribes, or sedentary plains tribes. Nomadic tribes, as they remain in transit, never fully comply with state laws, while sedentary hill tribes adhere passionately to Pashtunwali and prefer to avoid state authority. Due to their mobility and tightly knit social bonds, isolated tribes have historically resisted state authority. Even the Pakhtuns in plain areas resisted the use of force by outsiders, as independence has been their historical norm. To manage the Pakhtun tribes, British colonial authorities introduced policies like the Close Border and Frontier Crimes Regulation, aiming to control hill tribes indirectly. These efforts, however, were met with resistance, as Pakhtuns rejected external authority and preferred tribal customs. To strengthen the buffer between India and Afghanistan, a new Forward Policy was implemented, focusing on Balochistan and aiming to co-opt the tribes within designated settlement areas. The effectiveness of the policy could not be repeated in the NWFP, but it did result in establishing order among the tribes. By delegating certain functions, political agents administered tribes through maliks who were paid allowances and incentives. The Bri­tish underestima­ted the Pakhtuns’ passion for independe­nce, as the hill tri­bes viewed indirect rule as a way to provide administrative space to the British. The malik system helped them maintain an acceptable level of order but failed to establish authority and deterred them from directly engaging with the tribes, which contributed to its lack of success. To address weakly governed areas in the NAP, the third point states that militants will not be allowed to operate; point 12 recommends Fata reforms, point 16 mentions operations in Karachi, and point 17 emphasises reconciliation in Balochistan. In the revised NAP, the first point stresses intolerance for militancy, point 10 focuses on reconciliation in Balochistan, and point 11 highlights reforms in the merged areas. By drafting NAP, the state has fulfilled its legal obligation. Achieving such a goal is the joint responsibility of the federal and provincial governments. The post-18th Amendment scenario warrants magnanimity on the part of all stakeholders. National security and national interest are not to be interpreted narrowly; ideally, they are to be a collective resolve. . X: